Public Opinion and the Abolition or Retention of the Death Penalty
Why is the United States Different?
Sara Sun Beale*

What explains the difference between the United States and the many other countries that
have abolished capital punishment? Because the United States and many other nations that have
abolished the death penalty are democracies, there seems to be an obvious answer: abolition or
retention reflects the preferences of the electorate. According to this view, the U.S. electorate is
simply more punitive, and the question becomes explaining the difference in national attitudes.
There is some truth to this explanation. As I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. public generally
does favor punitive criminal justice policies.1 But that cannot be the whole story. Other nations
have abolished capital punishment despite widespread public support—in many cases, support of
more than 70 percent of the public at the time of abolition. In the United States, however, after
the Supreme Court imposed a de facto moratorium on capital punishment in the early 1970s,
strong public support led to its reintroduction in two-thirds of the states.
This paper explores the relationship between public opinion and the abolition or retention
of the death penalty, comparing the U.S. experience to that of other nations (with a particular
focus on Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada). Although the experience of each
country includes distinctive elements, several common themes emerge. In each country, political
elites led the abolition movement. The structure of the electoral process and the parliamentary
party system, moreover, allowed legislators and other public officials a degree of insulation from
popular opinion. The elites differed from their electorates in education, experience, and
knowledge of the issue. Because of these differences, support for capital punishment was much
lower among these elites than among the general public. In abolishing capital punishment, the
elites acted in accordance with their own views, rather than those of the median voter or the
general public. Some scholars have characterized this type of political behavior as the “elite
leadership hypothesis.” Additionally, international agreements and norms played a significant
role in Europe, making abolition difficult to reverse once enacted and helping to persuade other
nations to abolish capital punishment despite the existence of popular support. Finally, abolition
(whether de jure or de facto) has had a tendency over time to reduce public support for capital
punishment, thus diminishing popular pressure to reverse course.
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In contrast, the U.S. system has what one observer has called “hyper-democracy,”2 which
greatly reduces the likelihood that political elites will lead a movement toward the abolition of
capital punishment. Various features of the U.S. electoral process subject legislators and other
elected officials to significantly more political pressure than their international counterparts,
especially on hot-button issues like capital punishment. As a result, U.S. political elites have
much stronger incentives to act in accordance with public opinion. The federal structure has also
made abolition more difficult. The states have primary authority over the criminal law.
Although eighteen states have abolished the death penalty, support for the death penalty remains
very high in other states (especially in the South and Southwest). Additionally, the American
public and elected elites place little weight on international opinion, and the United States has
not joined international agreements that would require abolition. Paradoxically, however, the
Supreme Court has relied upon public opinion to overrule the results of the democratic process,
restricting (though not eliminating) capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
In light of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to abolish capital punishment, opponents
of capital punishment have adopted a two-pronged strategy. First, they are bringing
constitutional challenges to the methods of execution. Second, they are focusing their political
energy on state legislatures, where their arguments for abolishing the death penalty include both
the risk of wrongful convictions and the high cost of capital punishment relative to life
imprisonment.
After a general comparison of key differences between the electoral structure of the
United States and abolitionist countries, this paper turns to brief case studies of the abolition
experience in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The final section then
contrasts these case studies with the U.S. experience.
I.

Institutional Structures and Political Culture
A. The U.S. System: Hard Wired to Be Responsive to Public Opinion

In the United States a variety of institutional structures and closely related cultural
features make legislators and other political leaders highly responsive to public opinion and also
less likely to act on distinctive elite views. Short electoral cycles, term limits, and the primary
election system mean that even the most senior elected officials are continuously considering the
electoral implications of their actions, raising campaign contributions, and often deliberately
cultivating an anti-elite image.
At both the state and federal level, terms of service and electoral cycles are generally
short. In general, state laws provide for two-year terms for members in the lower state house,
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two- or four-year terms for the upper chamber, 3 and four-year terms for the governor. In
addition, fifteen states limit the number of years an elected member may serve in the state
legislature,4 and many states also have term limits for the governor. At the federal level,
members of the House of Representatives serve two-year terms, the President serves a four-year
term, and Senators serve six-year terms.
Primary elections are used to select the Republican and Democratic candidate for each
electoral position, and even incumbents must run in the primary election. In state and federal
elections, even senior party leaders may lose their positions in the primary or general election if
they are perceived as out of touch with the voters in their district. For example, in June 2014, the
second-highest-ranking Republican in the House of Representatives, Majority Leader Eric
Cantor, was defeated in the primary election by a political newcomer who ran with the
endorsement of the Tea Party. The winning candidate criticized Cantor for being too willing to
compromise on immigration and support some form of amnesty for undocumented immigrants.
A conservative commentator said “that the primary results were ‘an absolute repudiation of
establishment politics’ and that Republican leaders should take note.”5 Indeed, the media
attributed Cantor’s loss, in part, to the close associations he maintained with political elites in
Washington at the expense of serving his own constituents.6 Commentators predicted that
Cantor’s defeat would push the Republican House leadership further to the right and embolden
the chamber’s most stubborn conservatives, who had long chafed at what they saw as “an
accommodating leadership.”7 Similar defeats have occurred in general elections: in 1994, House
Speaker Thomas Foley, the leader of the House Democrats, lost to a little-known Republican
during a general election that delivered control of Congress to the Republicans.8
The political culture in the United States generally rewards candidates “who are
conspicuously anti-elitist in their rhetoric and folksy in their self-presentation.”9 For example,
some voters supported George W. Bush because “he is a ‘guy’s guy.’… because he seems like
the kind of guy you could ‘sit down and have a beer with.’ You know, kick back with a couple of
ice cold Budweisers, talk about deer hunting, and then go out back and cut down some trees
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together.”10 Seeking to capitalize on this phenomenon, candidates frequently dress in jeans or
other casual clothing at public appearances and in photographs for their campaign literature.
Carol Steiker argues that this institutional culture creates a strong tendency to defer to
public opinion rather than adopt a distinctly elite position:
…Americans have always tended toward a conception of government as appropriately
“provincial, amateur, authentic, spontaneous, candid, homogeneous, traditional, popular,
organic, rights-oriented, religious, voluntary, participatory, and rotational” as opposed to
“cosmopolitan, expert, authoritative, efficient, confidential, articulated in its parts,
progressive, elite, mechanical, duties-oriented, secular, regulatory, and delegative.” This
political culture creates a strong tendency to defer to clear majority sentiment, not merely
as a matter of political expediency, but also as a reflection of the role-conception of
elected officials.11
B. The Abolitionist States: Insulating Public Officials From Public Opinion
From a U.S. perspective, the idea that elected officials would buck public opinion on a major
issue like capital punishment is surprising, but that is exactly what occurred in virtually every
country that abolished the death penalty. Although each case study described below includes
unique features or historical events, common elements of the electoral systems promoted a
critical degree of independence from public opinion. Institutional and cultural factors also
fostered the development of politicians who understood their role to be using their expertise to
make decisions in the public interest, rather than simply representing the views of the electorate.
Once each country had abolished capital punishment, two other factors then made its
reintroduction less likely. First, several international treaties banned capital punishment, making
it much more difficult for signatory countries to change course while at the same time giving
politicians an excuse for maintaining the status quo. Second, abolition itself seemed to change
public opinion over time, reducing support for capital punishment.
In general, capital punishment fell under the jurisdiction of the national legislature in the
countries studied,12 and their electoral systems shielded individual legislators somewhat from
reprisals from the electorate for their votes on an issue such as capital punishment. In these
electoral systems, incumbent members typically held terms of office significantly longer than
their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, primary elections generally were not used in Europe or
Canada, and voters selected candidates in the general election on the basis of their party
affiliation, rather than voting for individuals. Most incumbents did not anticipate facing a
reelection campaign within two years or less, including a primary in which they may be
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challenged within their own party. Moreover, the fact that political parties chose their own
candidates for election rather than “throwing the question open to popular intervention” reduced
the chance that candidates would have to take populist stances on hotly contested issues like
capital punishment.13 It thus seems likely that, when deciding whether to abolish capital
punishment, legislators were less concerned about reelection than their U.S. counterparts.
These institutional features also promoted “a political culture in which political leaders are
viewed and view themselves as educated elites who have a duty to make decisions in light of
their expertise and thus, more often than in the United States, to lead the public rather than
follow it.”14 This is consistent with a trustee model of representation (associated with Edmund
Burke), rather than a delegate model.15 Given these institutional features, elites opposed to
capital punishment were more likely than their U.S. counterparts to openly support abolition,
and elite opinion became increasingly opposed to capital punishment. Politicians and other
influential elites accorded significant weight to research demonstrating that capital punishment
had no significant deterrent effect and that innocent persons had likely been executed.
Because policy concerning capital punishment was made at a national level, international
norms were more influential.16 And once capital punishment had been abolished, international
treaties made the reintroduction of capital punishment less likely. The Council of Europe played
a leading role in the battle for abolition, and all of the Council’s forty-seven member states have
now either abolished capital punishment or at least instituted a moratorium on executions. In
1983, the Council adopted a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights banning the
death penalty except in time of war, and in 2002, it abolished capital punishment in all
circumstances, even for acts committed in times of war.17 Abolition of the death penalty is now
a precondition for entry into the European Union.18 After abolition, these international treaties
serve both a legal and a political function. As a legal matter, they remove the issue from the
normal legislative agenda. As a political matter, politicians who want to maintain abolition and
satisfy the public can explain that international obligations effectively tie their hands.19 Finally,
these treaties provided an impetus for change in other countries (such as Turkey) that had not
already abolished the death penalty but wished to gain membership in the EU.
Finally, after a sufficient period, abolition has tended to delegitimize the death penalty
and reduce public support, thus diminishing the pressure for reintroduction.20 One study found
that, controlling for all other variables, citizens residing in a country with the death penalty are
almost three times as likely to support the death penalty as citizens living in a country without
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the death penalty.21 For instance, in France, support for the death penalty fell by 20 percent over
the course of approximately twenty-five years.22 Similarly, more than fifty years after abolition
of the death penalty in Germany, public support had fallen by more than 50 percent.23 This
change in behavior did not happen immediately, and it was likely due in part to the attitudes of
younger generations who grew up without capital punishment.24
II. Case Studies
This section provides brief case studies of abolition in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and France, which are discussed in chronological order.
A.

Germany25

The German politicians and other elites who brought about the abolition of capital
punishment in 1949 were influenced by two major factors: scholarship demonstrating that capital
punishment did not deter crime and had a brutalizing effect on the public, and Germany’s
experience with state-sponsored violence during World War II.26 Abolition was accomplished
by adding Article 102 to the “Basic Law” (which functions as Germany’s constitution). At the
time of abolition, 77 percent of the public supported capital punishment,27 but German political
elites viewed the public as inexpert and uninterested in important scholarship demonstrating its
lack of deterrence.28 Some country-specific factors also played an important role. The recent
Nazi regime’s abuses of the death penalty served as a cautionary tale of the evils of statesponsored violence.29
Germany’s institutional structure and norms created the necessary environment for change by
providing a degree of insulation from public opinion. The structure of Germany’s representative
democracy buffered the political elites from constantly changing political opinion, and these
elites understood their role in Burkean terms.30 One politician went so far as to characterize the
essence of democracy as a “parliamentary aristocracy governed by well-trained elites.”31
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Although German politicians might not use this language today,32 it conveys an important insight
into the structure of European politics.
The German electoral process insulates members of the German federal parliament, the
Bundestag, from the electorate. Although some members of the Bundestag are directly elected,
others are selected by their political party, which places them on its list of candidates.33 The
majority party or governing coalition then selects the prime minister. This institutional structure
somewhat shields German representatives from popular opinion and puts primacy on a Burkean
trusteeship model of government where a politician’s action is not dictated simply by the
preference of a majority of his constituency.34 This structure, and the norms that underlie it,
allowed the key German political actors to act outside of public opinion and in accordance with
their own understanding of the negative effects of capital punishment.
Expert opinion was critical not only to the abolition of capital punishment 1949, but also
in preventing reinstatement. The German Criminal Law Commission “played an important role
in deferring and defusing the contentious issue of capital punishment.”35 In the late 1950s,
reinstatement of capital punishment gained political support.36 At that time, individual
lawmakers in Germany normally did not submit important legislation unless it had been worked
out in relevant government ministries and was subsequently voted on by the Federal Cabinet.37
In matters of criminal law, the Federal Cabinet largely deferred to the Commission, which was
composed of academics, judges, prosecutors, and other legal bureaucrats,38 who consistently
opposed the death penalty.39 This process allowed politicians to avoid reprisal from the public,
both before and after the Commission made decisions. Politicians could point to the
Commission’s ongoing deliberations as “an excuse to defer considering the question
themselves,” and after its vote “they could avoid taking personal responsibility for any position
on the death penalty by pointing to the Commission’s careful consideration of the issue and the
rejection of capital punishment.”40 Additionally, abolition’s constitutional status meant that even
strong majorities fell short of the required two-thirds vote to amend the Basic Law.41
Finally, Germany signed onto several international treaties codifying abolition, thus
further adding to the institutional barriers preventing the reintroduction of capital punishment.
Germany is a party to Protocols 6 and 13 of the Council of Europe, which ban capital
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punishment.42 Further complicating any effort to reintroduce capital punishment, abolition of the
death penalty is also a precondition for entry to or membership in the European Union.43
B.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, as in Germany, opposition to capital punishment became
increasingly prevalent among elites, and elite views carried the day in Parliament despite strong
public support for retention. Elites were influenced by research demonstrating a lack of any
deterrent effect,44 and there were recent cases in which it appeared that innocent men had been
executed for crimes they did not commit.45 When the Labour government took office in 1964,
there was widespread support for abolition among members of the House of Commons,
including Conservatives,46 and the new government gave its support—first tacit and later
explicit—to abolition legislation sponsored by a backbencher who was not part of party
leadership. Despite public opinion polls showing that 60 to 70 percent of the electorate favored
retention, Parliament imposed a five-year ban on capital punishment.47 Four years later,
Parliament abolished capital punishment for ordinary crimes.48 The Conservative party chose
not to make an issue of Labour policies that might have engaged “the more extreme prejudices of
the electorate,”49 and leaders of the three major parties voted individually for the bill making
abolition permanent.
The government did not publicly support the initial steps toward abolition, though it
provided increasingly strong support. The legislation that suspended the death penalty for five
years arose from a private member’s bill,50 and it was passed by a free vote.51 The issuing
member of the bill was Sydney Silverman, a backbencher at the time, who was a former Labour
party leader and longtime opponent of the death penalty.52
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Reliance on the private-member bill and a free vote allowed the Labour party to claim
that the abolition of the death penalty was not part of its agenda. The bill originated from a
backbencher and was voted on individually by members of Parliament.53 Behind the scenes,
however, the government provided significant support for the moratorium bill. It made
legislative time available and encouraged the Queen to express support for the bill.54 When she
later mentioned the bill in a speech, it was the first time she had referred to a private member’s
bill in her public comments.55
In 1969, the Labour party leadership decided to schedule the final vote on abolition a year
earlier than initially planned to reduce its proximity to the next general election.56 Although this
was again a free vote, party leaders led by example, with all three major party leaders in the
House of Commons voting for abolition.57 This leadership proved invaluable, as it heavily
influenced the House of Lords to pass the measure, and led to the permanent abolition of the
death penalty in 1969.58
The United Kingdom’s commitment to international treaties has erected significant
obstacles to any attempts to reintroduce capital punishment. In 2002, the United Kingdom
signed Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which prohibits capital punishment in all circumstances.59 Although public opinion
has continually been in favor of the death penalty, multiple attempts to reintroduce it have
failed.60
The United Kingdom’s abolition of the death penalty differs from the German story in
two important ways. First, abolition in the United Kingdom occurred in stages, with a
moratorium preceding final abolition, whereas the Germans abolished capital punishment in one
fell swoop. Second, the United Kingdom’s political elite made deft use of parliamentary
procedures that allowed them to distance themselves from the legislation. But, in both countries,
the story is still essentially one of political elites making decisions contrary to public opinion.
These strategies were seen as “elite measures, which were crafted and implemented in response
to advances in criminology and psychology, rather than [in reaction] to pressure from public
opinion.”61
C.

Canada

Canada’s path to abolition included many of the same elements as those in other case
histories: strong support from committed elites whose views differed substantially from those of
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the public, multiple moratoriums before final abolition, research finding that the moratoria did
not increase crime, and passage of the critical legislation by free votes. The Canadian Executive
kickstarted the process by using the clemency power to create a de facto moratorium and unlike
in Germany or the United Kingdom, the parliamentary debate was especially prolonged and
impassioned, focusing on moral objections to the state taking life. Although subsequent efforts
to reinstate capital punishment have come close to success in the past, treaty obligations now
commit Canada to abolition.
Executive action created a de facto moratorium from 1963–67. When the Liberal Party
came to power, the federal cabinet exercised the crown’s clemency power to commute every
capital case to life imprisonment.62 During this informal moratorium, support for the death
penalty in Parliament declined.63 After four years under the de facto moratorium, the Canadian
Solicitor General published a report concluding that suspension of the death penalty had not
increased the homicide rate. 64
The federal government then proposed legislation to impose a formal moratorium, as well
as other bills intended to make Canada’s sentencing laws more humane. Because the minority
government recognized that capital punishment was still considered legitimate by much of the
country and that Parliament itself was deeply divided, it proposed a compromise: an
experimental five-year moratorium excluding those convicted of mudering police officers and
other law enforcement officials.65 Under a new prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, this
moratorium was extended.66
In 1976, the staunchly abolitionist Solicitor General introduced Bill C-84 to abolish the
death penalty.67 Despite the fact that over 70 percent of the population supported capital
punishment,68 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau gave the bill his “impassioned” support.69
He characterized capital punishment as “the emotive response of a ‘socially bankrupt’ society,”
not fit for a modern, rational state.70 Parliament remained deeply divided, and the debate was
highly charged and prolonged: 120 members spoke over a period of several months.71
Opponents questioned the legitimacy of the bill in light of the strong popular support for the
death penalty, raised the specter of terrorism and increases in violent crime, and tried to weaken
the bill with amendments. The bill’s fate was uncertain.
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The Prime Minister and Solicitor General opted for a free vote, because it would insulate
the government if the vote failed. The bill passed by a slim margin of 130 to 124, abolishing the
death penalty for all ordinary offenses.72
Although Parliament came close to reinstating the death penalty in 1987, Canada remains
abolitionist.73 In 2005, the Canadian government signed and ratified the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (aimed at international
abolition of the death penalty), which now prevents Canada from reinstating the death penalty. 74
D.

France

France’s path to abolition was similar to that of Canada’s: the executive was the moving
force in revising the penal code and abolishing capital punishment in 1981.75 Even though public
opinion favored the death penalty, François Mitterand announced during his campaign for
President that he would abolish capital punishment if elected.76 Once Mitterand and his leftist
parties took office, the new Justice Minister, Robert Badinter, expedited review of the abolition
law through parliament. The French Parliament then abolished the death penalty by a vote de
conscience.77 Strong executive leadership, influenced by French academics and law reform
committees,78 provided the catalyst that led to abolition. It is worthy of note, however, that the
vote de conscience meant that abolition reflected the sentiments of the individual members of
parliament rather than their party.
International treaties and a constitutional amendment subsequently cemented France’s
stance as an abolitionist country. Because the French Constitution provides that treaties prevail
over acts of parliament,79 after France signed and ratified Protocol 6 to the European Convention
on Human Rights, it became much more difficult for French lawmakers to reintroduce capital
punishment. The only way for France to bring back the death penalty would have been to
repudiate the treaty, exposing it to external criticism and repercussions.80 In 2007, France further
raised the institutional barriers to the reintroduction of capital punishment by modifying its
constitution to prohibit the death penalty.81 Despite persistent public opposition, France has
rendered its absolutionist stance irrevocable for all practical purposes.
II.
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In the U.S., the story was quite different. Following a Supreme Court decision that
created a de facto moratorium in 1972, legislatures in two thirds of the states acted quickly to
write new legislation reinstating the death penalty. Although U.S. public support for capital
punishment had dropped to 50%—a much lower rate than any of the case-study countries at the
time of abolition—both state and federal politicians came under extreme pressure to support the
death penalty. Public support for capital punishment surged, and it became a major political
issue over the next four decades. Both parties embraced it.
Confronted with the surge in public support, the Supreme Court developed an Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence that depends upon public opinion. The Court has employed this
doctrine to limit, but not prohibit, capital punishment.
A. Support for Capital Punishment Declines and the Supreme Court Imposes a De
Facto Moratorium
After World War II there was significant support in the U.S. for the abolition of the death
penalty. As measured by public opinion polls, support for capital punishment declined through
the 1950s and early 1960s to a low of 42% in 1966.82 Between 1964 and 1969 six states
abolished capital punishment, and the number of executions fell from 15 executions in 1964, to
seven in 1965, one in 1966, two in 1967, and then none from 1968 until the mid 1970s.83 By
1969, 10 states had abolished capital punishment, but it was still authorized in the remaining 40
states and in federal prosecutions.84
Opponents of the death penalty mounted a sustained effort to persuade the Supreme
Court that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in contemporary U.S.
society. In 1972, they had a major victory. In Furman v. Georgia,85 a five-to-four majority set
aside the death sentences in three cases from Georgia and Texas. The result was announced in a
short per curiam opinion that provided no explanation of the decision. Each member of the
Court wrote separately, and their opinions totaled 230 pages.
Two Justices concluded that imposing capital punishment violated the Eighth
Amendment because it was incompatible with evolving conceptions of human dignity. Justice
Brennan compared capital punishment to “barbaric” punishments like the rack and the
thumbscrew, 86 and he concluded that in contemporary society it was morally unacceptable.
Justice Marshall wrote that the death penalty made no measureable contribution to legitimate
legislative objectives, and that the average American citizen, if fully informed on the issue,
would find it “shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”87
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In contrast, the three other justices who made up the majority focused on the capital
sentencing procedures. In trials for capital offenses, juries in most states returned a sentence
recommendation at the same time they returned a guilty verdict, and the typical jury instructions
provided no standards or criteria for making this decision. Moreover, juries generally heard no
evidence about the defendant’s character, personal background, or prior criminal history. Justice
Douglas wrote that these sentencing statutes operated in a manner that was “pregnant with
discrimination” against poor, black defendants.88 Of 3,895 persons executed between 1930 and
1968, 2,066 were black.89 Of the 2,306 persons executed in the Southern states during this
period, 72% were black. Justice White stated that the Georgia statute provided “no meaningful
basis” for distinguishing the cases where death was imposed from others in which it was not.90
Justice Stewart wrote that capital punishment was being “wantonly and freakishly imposed,” and
he compared it to being hit by lightning.91
The justices in the majority believed that invalidating the death penalty was the correct
action as a matter of policy, and Justices Stewart and White based their votes on the assumption
that affirming the death penalty in the case before them would only delay its inevitable
abolition.92 Their actions seem to parallel the elite actions in the countries examined in the case
study above.
Although there was no majority opinion in Furman, all capital punishment statutes in the
United States had the same procedural flaws as the Georgia and Texas statutes. Accordingly, the
Furman decision effectively invalidated every death penalty statute then in force, producing a de
facto moratorium on capital punishment throughout the United States. Opponents hoped that this
would be the end of capital punishment in the United States. It was not.
B. The States Respond to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court Responds to
the States
Furman provoked a dramatic response from the state legislatures. In just four years, 35
states—including Georgia and Texas—enacted new capital sentencing statutes designed to
respond to the procedural objections of Justices Douglas, White, and Stewart. In Gregg v.
Georgia, a 7-to-2 majority of the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s new “guided discretion”
capital sentencing scheme was constitutional.93 These new procedures, the majority ruled,
sufficiently addressed the concern that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. In a later case, the Court acknowledged that the state legislative action had
been critical to its decision in Gregg:
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Thirty-five States immediately reinstituted the death penalty for at least limited
kinds of crime. This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital
punishment, evidenced by the immediate, post-Furman legislative reaction in a
large majority of the States, heavily influenced the Court to sustain the death
penalty for murder in Gregg v. Georgia.94
Gregg held that the death penalty could not be imposed if it caused unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain or if it was grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
Whether the death penalty was constitutionally excessive would be determined by “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”95 rather than by an analysis
of historical practice at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted. Consistency with evolving
standards of decency would be determined by two factors. First, the Court would consider the
“objective evidence” of a national consensus, particularly the enactments of the nation’s
legislatures and actual implementation of the punishment where a legislature makes it available.
This methodology implicitly countered the criticism that the Court was simply imposing its own
policy preference in the guise of constitutional interpretation.96 Only after considering these
objective indicators would the Court make its own subjective judgment of what cruel and
unusual punishment meant under the Eighth Amendment, and would then be the final arbiter on
the matter.
C. U.S. Public Opinion Favoring Capital Punishment Skyrockets and the Political
Elites Get the Message
The U.S. experienced a steep rise in support for capital punishment beginning in the early
1970s. When the strength of the public’s views became clear, the elites generally fell into line,
expressing their own strong support for retention and implementation of the death penalty.
Although many Democrats initially opposed the death penalty and other punitive crime policies,
they generally jumped on the bandwagon when it became clear that opposition would cost them
elections.
By 1976, when the Supreme Court decided Gregg, 66% of the public supported capital
punishment, and support continued to increase, peaking at 80% in 1994 and then holding steady
at roughly 70–75% until the turn of the century.97 Crime became a major political issue.
National polls identified crime as the most important problem facing the United States in every
year from 1994 to 1998, and in 1999 and 2000 it was selected as the second or third most
important problem.98 Although a full discussion of the “law and order” politics and the “war on
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crime” is beyond the scope of this paper,99 commentators have identified a variety of factors that
seem to have played a role. These include concern about the rising crime rates, a dramatic rise in
sensational coverage of violent crime in the news media, a backlash against the gains of the civil
rights movement, and opportunist Republican efforts to attract formerly Democratic voters
(especially those in Southern States that had most strongly opposed national civil rights
legislation associated with the Democratic party).100
In this atmosphere, harsher penalties, including the death penalty, became “an issue
people cared about, an emotional issue of powerful symbolic significance,”101 and attitudes about
the death penalty came to have “powerful symbolic significance, support for the death penalty
representing and ideological self-definition of the person as unyielding in the war on crime,
unwilling to coddle criminals, firm and courageous.”102
Recognizing the power of the issue, U.S. politicians emphasized their support for the
death penalty. At the state level, for example, the death penalty played a prominent role in three
gubernatorial races in 1990:
In California, John K. Van de Kamp ran a television advertisement with a gas chamber in
the background, highlighting the number of murderers that he put or kept on death row in
his roles as District Attorney and Attorney General. In Texas, Jim Mattox ran against
Ann Richards in the Democratic primary with ads taking credit for thirty-two executions
in his role as Attorney General. In Florida, incumbent Governor Bob Martinez ran ads
boasting of the ninety-plus death warrants he had signed while in office. 103
The death penalty has also been an important factor in many federal elections, including
presidential elections. In a nationally televised 1988 presidential debate Democratic candidate
Michael Dukakis was badly hurt when he said he would not change his opposition to the death
penalty if his wife were raped and murdered. Reporters concluded that Dukakis lost the debate
in that single answer, and viewers across the country reported expressed “outrage” at his
response. Indeed, almost 20 years later his response is still being cited as an example of the kind
99
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of answer that can kill a political candidate’s career.104 Subsequent Democratic candidates did
not make the same mistake. Indeed, then Governor Bill Clinton returned to Arkansas during his
1992 presidential campaign to facilitate the execution of a mentally disabled murderer.105 In
2000, each of the initial eleven candidates for president, despite their ideological differences,
declared his support for the death penalty.106 Current President Barak Obama supports capital
punishment (though he notes that it should be reserved for heinous crimes).107
D. The Supreme Court’s Majoritarian Constitutional Doctrine
One of the puzzles of the U.S. experience is how to explain the Supreme Court’s actions,
and the related question of how to assess them. The Court’s 1972 decision in Furman was
surprising for several reasons: the decision had no support in the text of the Constitution (which
clearly provides for capital punishment), and the Court itself had recently turned back a
challenge to state capital punishment procedures.108 In 1972 the Furman majority reached out
for the issue and broke entirely new ground. But just four years later in Gregg it backed down,
announcing a new Eighth Amendment doctrine that has been widely criticized as lacking a firm
constitutional foundation and failing to achieve its declared purposes, while nonetheless still
managing to unduly interfere with the democratic legislative process.
1. Explaining the Court’s decision
I find persuasive the argument that the majority was acting in Furman (as elites did in
other abolitionist nations) to advance its own view of good policy, but that it was completely
unprepared for the strong public reaction and unwilling to stake its institutional prestige on the
issue. As Corinna Barrett Lain has explained, the pressure on the Court was fierce, and its
legitimacy was at stake:
In 1976, remaining true to Furman's holding would have been hazardous to the
Court's institutional authority. In the wake of Furman, legislators had threatened a
constitutional amendment to reinstate the death penalty, and by 1976, they were
close to having the numbers to pull something like that off. Even a failed, but
concerted, attempt to override the Court would have been a severe blow to its
power and legitimacy. With public opinion favoring the death penalty 2 to 1, both
political parties aligning on the issue, and the solicitor general asking the Court to
overrule its 1972 decision, it is hard to imagine the Justices in Gregg doing
anything other than what they did--retreat.109
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It is understandable, then, that the majority sought to articulate a doctrine that placed
some limits on the imposition of capital punishment without provoking a constitutional or
political crisis. But what of the doctrine that it developed?
2. Critiques of the Supreme Court’s doctrine
The first criticism is that Court’s doctrine is far too limited: it provides only
“constitutional protection that follows, rather than frustrates, majority will, prohibiting a
punishment only after most states have abandoned it on their own.”110
A second criticism is that the statutory schemes endorsed by the Court do not solve the
problem of arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty. Statistical reviews
found continuing disparities by race of the victim, with suspects charged with killing white
victims far more likely to receive the death penalty than those who killed black victims.111 The
Supreme Court held that a study finding such disparities in the application of Georgia’s statute
did not demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment.112 In contrast, the American Law
Institute—which had promulgated the template upon which all post-Furman statutes depend—
withdrew its support in 2009, citing “intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring
a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.”113
Critics charge that the doctrine announced in Gregg fails on its own terms, because the
Court has been unable—or unwilling—to make a truly “objective” determination of state
practices and public attitudes. In many of its cases, plausible arguments could be made for
different categorizations of state law that favor or undermine a finding of a national consensus,
and the analysis by both the majority and dissent appears to be rather transparently result-driven,
rather than objective.114 Moreover, the Court has flip-flopped, reversing recent decisions after a
slim majority identified a new consensus precluding the execution of juveniles and persons who
are mentally ill.115
A closely related problem is that the Court’s own decisions have constrained—and in some
cases precluded—the development of any new consensus on the desirability of extending the
death penalty. For example, a sharply divided Court held in 2008 that the Eighth Amendment
barred the state of Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the
crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death.116 The majority
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emphasized that only six states permitted the imposition of the death penalty for rape of a child.
More broadly, the decision appeared to signal that (absent a change in the Court’s membership)
death would be deemed disproportionate to any crime against an individual person in which the
victim’s life was not taken, though the majority also noted that it was expressing no opinion
about capital punishment for crimes against the state, such as treason.117 In dissent, Justice Alito
observed that the Court’s prior decisions had stunted legislative consideration of the question
whether the death penalty for the targeted offense of raping a young child is consistent with
prevailing standards of decency, and its decision was extinguishing what might well have been
the beginning of new trend.118
IV.

A Few Observations and Conclusions

The case studies confirmed that at least in the particular times of abolition in Germany,
the U.K., Canada, and France, elite opinion turned against the death penalty and brought about
abolition despite strong public support for retention. To some degree, these elite actors relied
upon a degree of insulation from public opinion and pressure that does not exist for elected
officials in the United States, and they had a conception of their role that is not widely shared by
U.S. political elites.
The comparison to the experience in these countries also highlights the importance of the
U.S. federal system and its allocation of authority over criminal law to the States. With a few
limited exceptions, the Supreme Court has now left control of capital punishment to the
democratic process at the states level.
Dramatic regional differences in attitudes and practices have emerged. By the turn of the
century, national polls began to show a significant decline in support for capital punishment, and
a recent poll found that only 42% favored the death penalty for murder if life without parole
were available.119 Three states have abolished the death penalty since 2011.120 But support
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remains strong in some regions, and capital punishment has become a minority practice localized
almost entirely in a small number of states, and within certain counties. Since the Supreme
Court reinstituted the death penalty in 1976, 2,008 persons have been executed; 1,754 of those
were executed in Texas, Oklahoma, and states in the South.121 Texas alone accounted for 515 of
the total executions.122 One advocacy group reports that only 2% of the counties in the U.S. have
been responsible for the majority of cases leading to executions, as well as the majority of the
current population of death row.123
Allocating authority over the retention of the death penalty to the states means that there
is no mechanism to enforce a national policy of abolition, should such a policy develop, other
than through the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, at the state and
local level, international norms—which might have some traction with the national
government—are generally unpersuasive.
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